The economic analysis of spectrum policy focuses on government revenues in license assignments. Auctions generating high bids, as in Germany and the UK, are identified as "successful," while those producing lower receipts, as in Switzerland and the Netherlands, are deemed "fiascoes." Yet, even full and costless extraction of license rents does not map directly to social welfare, because spectrum policies creating rents impose social costs. Most obviously, rules favoring monopoly market structure predictably increase license values, but reduce welfare. This paper attempts to shift analytical focus to the relationship between spectrum policy (including license auctions) and efficiency in output markets. In cross-country comparisons of performance metrics in 28 mobile telephone markets, empirical estimates suggest that countries allocating greater bandwidth to licensed operators and achieving more competitive market structures realize demonstrable social welfare benefits. These gains generally dominate efficiencies associated with license sales. Spectrum policies and rules intended to increase auction receipts (e.g. reserve prices and subsidies for weak bidders), should be evaluated in this light.
I. INTRODUCTION
Competitive bidding to assign wireless licenses constitutes a substantial policy advance. Following their suggestion by Leo Herzel (1951) and Ronald Coase (1959) , auctions were finally adopted by New Zealand in 1989 (Crandall 1998), India in 1991 (Jain 2001) , and the United States in 1993 (McMillan 1994) . At least twenty-five other countries have instituted license auctions in recent years (Hazlett 2008b ).
The argument for using the "price system" to allocate wireless licenses is premised on three types of economic efficiencies: a) elimination of rent dissipation associated with "comparative hearings" or "beauty contest" awards (Kwerel & Felker 1985) ; b) assignment of licenses to the most productive suppliers, saving the costs of secondary market reassignments (Cramton 2002, 608) ; c) generation of public revenues, displacing taxes; the consensus estimate is that $0.33 in social cost is saved for every tax dollar saved (Cramton 2001, 48; Klemperer 2002b, 179) .
3
A healthy literature on the implementation of wireless auctions has emerged. 4 Revenues raised by government auctions are seen both as indicators of auction design efficiency and as appropriated surplus that increases social welfare by offsetting activitydistorting taxes. Consequently, auction success is typically measured by license receipts.
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In evaluating alternative bidding mechanisms, Paul Klemperer has written: "What really matters in auction design are the same issues that any industry regulator would recognize as key concerns: discouraging collusive, entry-deterring and predatory behavior. … By contrast, most of the extensive auction literature … is of second-order importance for practical auction design" (Klemperer 2002b, 169-70, emphasis in original) . the social discount rate is ignored in auction processes that delay productive use of frequencies for months or years.
The problem is put into perspective with some simple estimates of social value. Empirical research undertaken a decade ago found annual consumer surplus associated with U.S. cellular telephone licenses (issued in the 1980s) at least ten times as large as annual producers' surplus (Hausman 1997; Rosston 2001) . Today, U.S. wireless phone market data yield annual consumer surplus estimate of at least $150 billion. 10 The total revenue obtained from selling all wireless licenses (not just for mobile telephony) is just $53 billion.
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Given that the latter is a present value and the former an annual flow, these data suggest that the ratio (CS to PS) is much above an order of magnitude.
Policies undertaken to improve license revenues, then, focus on a small fraction of the economic value at stake. Rules that increase auction bids but risk collateral damagesay, by reducing operator efficiency or market competitiveness -generate potential costs not properly evaluated by reference to rent extraction alone. This is true even when revenues raised by license auctions do, ceteris paribus, increase welfare.
We offer an extension of the Klemperer critique. Economists should not only consider market structure effects within auctions, but should incorporate consumer welfare effects from wireless output markets whenever alternative auction rules influence not only public rent extraction but retail prices.
We hasten to note that Paul Klemperer has correctly diagnosed the temptation to favor monopoly rent creation over competitive output markets. Klemperer (2002b, 185) comments on a proposal by Italian regulators (not, in fact, implemented) to eliminate a 3G 12 license (and the competitor it would empower) in order to raise auction revenues: " [T] he approach was fundamentally flawed…it is putting the cart before the horse to create an unnecessarily concentrated mobile-phone market to make an auction look good" (Ibid.). 13 In contrast, however, Klemperer endorses the policy implemented in 3G license auctions held in Belgium and Greece in 2001. Both countries appear to have raised incremental revenue by imposing reserve prices. The result was that each country sold three wireless licenses, with a fourth unsold. Klemperer credits the authorities for 10 This lower bound can be calculated from historical price-quantity pairs for wireless minutes of use (Hazlett 2008a) . Hausman (2002) , Entner & Lewin (2005) obtain similar estimates. 11 The FCC raised $52.6 billion through (and counting) the 700 MHz license auction completed in Marchproducing receipts of about 45 Euros per person, a rent extraction generating some public financing efficiency. Excluded from the analysis, however, is the fact that each unsold license was allocated approximately 35 MHz of bandwidth, 14 and that this frequency space could have been productively employed by a fourth network (if a willing entrant had come forth at a license price of between zero and 45 Euros per capita 15 ) or divvied up among the three incumbent networks to expand capacity. 16 After calibrating an empirical model measuring the relationship between frequencies allocated to cellular service and retail prices, we find that the welfare cost of withholding spectrum via reserve prices likely exceeded public gains from the revenues raised in either Belgium or Greece. This is one frequently-encountered example of how policies prescribed for license assignments alter market structure. The problem arises when the auction analysis does not then incorporate attendant welfare effects. We offer a critique of analytical partitioning that is asymmetrically broached.
Our empirical analysis focuses on wireless telephone service in twenty-eight countries, of which nineteen employ auctions to assign licenses. After adjusting for cross-sectional differences in demand and supply, we find that larger quantities of spectrum, as well as more intense competitiveness (measured by the HerfindahlHirschman Index), are strongly associated with lower prices. We then use the coefficient estimates from our model to perform simulations quantifying retail market effects associated with various policy changes. In general, auction rules intended to increase license rent extraction by restricting spectrum access are not welfare-enhancing. Restricting the use of spectrum inputs is a relatively expensive way to raise public funds. This paper is organized as follows. In Section II we describe our empirical model and report regression results. Section III uses these estimates to simulate welfare effects of policy choices made in the design of license auctions. Section IV offers a conclusion.
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SPECTRUM AND RETAIL PRICES

II.1. A SIMPLE MODEL
Consider a market where N firms will be producing a homogeneous mobile telephone service, with output levels given by q i where i identifies the firm. We assume there is no initial incumbent. Aggregate output is given by Q q i i = ∑ . The market price associated with this output is defined by the inverse demand function p(Q).
14 Sources: Greece: National Telecommunications and Post Commission, Press Release (July 13, 2001) , http://www.eet.gr/eng_pages/telec/umts/Main.htm Belgium: BIPT, "Communication of the BIPT concerning the results of the auction" (March 2, 2001) , http://www.umts.bipt.be/EN/PR%20English.pdf. 15 We here exclude the possibility of a subsidy to an entrant. 16 Although firms' bidding showed they had extremely low private values for additional spectrum in these auctions, there may be -as we argue below -substantial divergences between private and social spectrum value.
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Firm i has a cost function assumed to adopt the form:
This implies constant marginal cost given a particular level of capital, K i, and the amount of spectrum, S i , allocated to the license awarded firm i. When quantity decisions are made, capital and spectrum are fixed and the prices paid for these resources sunk. In order to focus the analysis on spectrum allocation policies, we assume symmetric investments (K i = K for all i). Marginal cost is decreasing in capital and spectrum, and these two inputs are substitutes (engineering cost models indicate that for a given level of service, as the amount of spectrum [MHz] increases, capital cost per subscriber falls [Reed 1992, 11-12, 20-21] ).
In what follows we assume Cournot competition. We denote market share as
, and price elasticity of demand as ) (Q ε . The spectrum allotted to a given license can be written as:
, where S is the total amount of spectrum assigned to wireless services. In such a context it is easy to show that a Mark Up equation is defined by:
We interpret the equilibrium Mark Up equation (II.2) as one where the supply depends on the elasticity of demand ε(Q), the level of investment (K), the amount of allocated spectrum (S), and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).
We assume demand for wireless telephony to be a function of the price of wireless service (p), income level (Y), and the price of alternative telephone services (F) . 18 In principle, we can posit a constant elasticity of demand function for wireless telephony such that:
In particular, when spectrum allotments are equal across competitive licenses, we get: (II.4) and (II.5) represent a system of equations in the endogenous variables ln(RPM) and ln (TOTMIN) . Given a sample of countries and quarterly data, we initially ran a fixed effects model to control for factors specific to the countries, such as population size and institutional differences. One problem encountered was that the variable Fixprice took the value zero in several countries (e.g., USA). To control for this truncation we introduced a dummy variable, dumfix, which takes the value of unity if the fixed line price is zero, and is otherwise equal to zero. Omitting Fixprice, we then included a variable defined as (1-dumfix)*ln(Fixprice) as a regressor we labeled Alfixprice. Given that dumfix did not change within countries during the sample period, it was absorbed in the fixed effect component. Likewise, the variables Auction and NotCPP dummies did not change over time for given countries, so in a standard fixed effects model their role would be missed. Another issue involved the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, which should not be considered exogenous. When additional spectrum is allocated, it is expected to negatively impact market concentration. We will return to this problem momentarily.
The estimation procedure adopted involves three stages. In the first, we perform a "within" transformation for unbalanced panel data. Then we run a standard 3SLS regression for the system of equations (II.4) (II.5) considering as endogenous variables ln(RPM), ln(TOTMIN) and ln (HHI) . In the second, we use the residuals of the first stage to capture the effect of time-invariant variables (NotCPP and Auction dummies in our database), generating pseudo-fixed effects. In the third, we again perform a 3SLS procedure to estimate the system with the variables in levels, including the pseudo-fixed effects and time-invariant explanatory variables. The details are given in Appendix 2. A summary of final results for different specifications of the model is given in Table II 20 The model selection process is described in Appendix 2.
The use here of fixed effects panel data estimation could be challenged on various grounds. On the one hand, a totally pooled model is the simplest approach. Following Baltagi (2001, Chs. 2 and 4) a direct application of an F-test (separately applied for the Demand and Mark Up equations) permits us to reject, at a 1% confidence level, the null hypothesis that the fixed effects are all the same. 21 On the other hand, differences among countries could not be constrained to intercept terms and may make slopes "country specific." The size of our panel is of insufficient scale to statistically reject this hypothesis. 22 We assume, as is often done, that a fixed effects model is reasonable, supporting the assumption while improving the efficiency of our estimations by employing a pseudo-fixed effects approach. This permits us to measure the effect of time invariant variables.
The pseudo fixed effects model constrains the interpretation of coefficient estimates driven primarily by cross-country variation. The slope estimates relied on to evaluate policy counterfactuals are produced with an embedded assumption that, after controlling for explanatory variables that include fixed effects and time invariant variables, incremental impacts on equilibrium output (associated with, say, spectrum allocation changes) do not interact with those driven by other explanatory variables. A richer model capturing possible interactions would be desirable were data available.
Regression results, displayed in Table II .2, appear reasonable. For instance, while the purpose of this exercise is not to measure the price elasticity of demand, the model's estimate, -1.12, is very close to estimates reported for the U.S. market. 23 In addition, the estimated demand function exhibits a willingness to pay positively related to the GDP per capita, although at a decreasing rate. The total minutes demanded are increasing in the price of a local call using the fixed network (peak period), revealing a substitution effect between fixed and mobile services. A "not CPP" country exhibits, ceteris paribus, a 20 Some squared terms were dropped from the reported specification because they were not significant at conventional levels. Particularly important was the statistically insignificant effect of the interaction between spectrum and density in the Mark Up equation. 21 Another option is a random effects model, but we discard it because it is possible that we are omitting some explanatory variables that might be correlated with the included ones. In such a case, it is well known that OLS and random effects models are biased and inconsistent (Cardellichio, 1990) . 22 An alternative estimation that would allow different slopes between countries is Zellner's SUR approach or the Conniffe (1982) extension. We do not have sufficient degrees of freedom to pursue these procedures. However, there are some advantages to using panel data methods. For example, we can control for country level heterogeneity, we can improve efficiency, and we can measure effects that are undetectable in pure cross-section or pure time-series data. 23 Ingraham and Sidak (2004) estimated U.S. cellular elasticity of demand between -1.12 and -1.29. reduction in the number of total minutes demanded. We note that this result conflicts with Crandall (2005, 107-8) .
The Mark Up equation results suggest that the equilibrium price in the market increases with the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, but decreases with the amount of spectrum allocated to mobile services. These results are statistically significant, and are consistent with economic theory. It is expected that more competitive markets feature lower service prices, while expanded availability of radio spectrum lowers both fixed costs and variable operating expenses. Moreover, prices are decreasing in density, suggesting scale economies in the density dimension. 
III. THE ROLE OF SPECTRUM POLICY
To evaluate the price and welfare effects of spectrum policies, the empirical results obtained are incorporated into a series of possible scenarios. The approach forecasts how prices and quantities in retail markets respond to regulatory changes. In this procedure, the coefficient estimates of greatest interest are those in the Mark Up equation associated with LHHI and LSPECTRUM. These variables are directly affected by regulators.
The simulations follow the premise that the empirical model provides us with an estimated equilibrium and a 95% confidence interval within which the actual values should fall. Each equilibrium forecast is computed until it achieves stability. Then we estimate a confidence interval based on Hotelling's T 2 statistic. We also report a bootstrapped 95% confidence interval for the sake of comparison. Simulations were performed in 1000 groups of 1000 cases each, with shocks to the system of equations coming from a Bivariate Normal distribution with mean zero for each component, and the variance-covariance matrix estimated from the Stage 3 residuals explained in Appendix 2. These experiments were conducted at least a hundred of times to adjust the estimation; results were very stable.
Equilibrium Effects
To perform price-quantity simulations we adopted a "country like" approach, where we fixed the exogenous variables at their sample values for the particular country in an specific period, and then varied the quantity of spectrum (in MHz) available to the mobile telephony sector. The estimated model derived in the previous sub-section was then used to predict the effect on price and quantity.
The lower part of Table III .1 displays a graph with simulated results in UK in the first quarter of 2000, just before the assignment of 3G licenses (allocated 140 MHz of radio spectrum) via auction. It includes a 95% confidence interval. Price is decreasing in the amount of allocated spectrum, with the rate of decrease declining. Simulated retail prices are reduced because marginal costs fall with more abundant inputs and because the endogenous Herfindahl-Hirschman Index declines with more abundant spectrum. Similar simulations for other countries are reported below.
Welfare Effects
We may now evaluate changes in social welfare associated with incremental spectrum allocations. In our "country like" scenario we estimate the impact on potential consumer surplus and license revenues related to a policy that exogenously increases the spectrum allocated to the market in 20, 80, 140 and 200 MHz increments. We assume that the bandwidth increments are utilized for mobile phone services.
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The welfare change resulting from spectrum policy depends on four stochastic variables, initial and final prices and quantities. In the simulations we assume a Multivariate Normal distribution. Instead of using an analytic solution for the marginal distribution of this probability function, we simulate the behavior in the neighborhood of each equilibrium and then compute the change in surpluses. These differences then yield the resulting Welfare Change.
Expanded spectrum availability tends to cause industry concentration to decline. Take the U.S. case. The cellular telephone market was originally a duopoly, with 50 MHz of allocated spectrum split equally between the two licenses (per market). Then, personal communication licenses were auctioned in 1995 and 1997; the PCS licenses were, in aggregate, allocated 120 MHz. The additional bandwidth facilitated entry; by 2000, there were six competing national networks.
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In the simulations, additional spectrum reduces predicted HHI according to the endogenous relationship derived from the empirical model. This, however, may well under-estimate the effect of spectrum on concentration (or deconcentration) due to the model's fixed effects and the multi-year lags involved in the HHI-SPECTRUM relationship. During the sample period, for example, U.S. HHI fell as new networks expanded using PCS licenses auctioned years before, even as the U. The impact of network launches on HHI generally play out over several years.
It is likely that our sample, covering 4.5 years, is too short to adequately capture the lagged relationship. (Our attempt to estimate long lags produced coefficients that were not statistically significant.) If we are correct, the welfare estimates produced by our model should be interpreted as lower bounds for the social value of making additional radio spectrum available to network operators, a caveat reinforced by the exclusion of new services from the valuation estimates. sold for approximately $34 billion; applying the $0.33-per-dollar public financing bonus implies social gains of about $11.3 billion. Our simulation suggests, in comparison, that about $39 billion in consumer surplus gains were realized from the 140 MHz of radio spectrum being made available to operators. 28 This increase in surplus dominates the benefits associated with tax efficiency. This outcome is illuminating precisely because the British 3G auctions are widely considered to be the most successful example of license rent extraction.
Alternatively, consider the U.S. market for wireless telephony. Using parameters obtained in our cross-country pricing model, we simulate an increase of 60 MHz in spectrum allocated for mobile telephony (on a base of 170 MHz). This is associated with a decline in retail prices of about 8 percent. A price drop of this magnitude is, in turn, associated with an increase in consumer surplus of about $8.8 billion annually.
Given marginal license valuations of about $150 million per nationwide MHz, 29 the capitalized value of nationwide licenses allocated 60 MHz is about $9.1 billion.
30 If the public finance dividend applies, the tax efficiency gain of approximately $3.0 billion is projected to be just one-third the annual consumer gains associated with increased output. A delay of just five months swamps the public financing bonus altogether. 28 In Table III .1 we first report the estimated monthly impact on consumer surplus, revenues and welfare of additional spectrum allocations. Then we obtain annual effects and consider them as perpetuities which should be discounted, at some rate, to obtain net present values. The Annual Interest Rate (AIR) used for this purpose is 5% per year, as shown in the Table. This can be thought of as a real social discount rate. Since growth is expected for many years in wireless phone markets, it is not implausible that even if the (gross) discount rate is ten percent, that a net discount rate of 5% (reflecting anticipated growth of five percent) would be appropriate. 29 In Sept. 2006, the FCC's Advanced Wireless Services (AWS) auction yielded $13.7 billion for licenses allocated 90 MHz nationwide. This implies valuation of about $152 million per MHz. This auction involved the first new allocation of spectrum for mobile licenses following PCS (2G), and can be considered an approximation of marginal license value for the base period calibrating our estimates. March 2008 auction prices for licenses allocated 700 MHz spectrum were about twice as high on $price/MHz/pop basis. The UHF airwaves allocated in the latter auction were thought to yield generally superior propagation characteristics. 30 These are present values, not flows. Licenses, once assigned to high bidders, are then renewed without competitive bidding so long as the licensees complies with regulatory rules. Klemperer (2002a, 840) writes: "Both countries held auctions for four licenses -and in each case attracted only the three incumbents, who therefore obtained licenses at the reserve prices which yielded about 45 Euros per capita in each case. It is very hard to argue plausibly that an auction deterred much entry when a license goes unsold, and there is also no obvious reason to criticise the reserve prices that these governments chose."
Our model helps analyze these arguments. Reserve prices do help to increase auction receipts, but the incremental revenue is not without social cost. The spectrum allocated to unsold licenses reduces operator efficiency and, perhaps, market competitiveness. While the latter implies that network entry would have occurred if the license were priced below the reserve level, the former does not. In this example, if each incumbent's license were allocated 1/3 the bandwidth allocated the fourth, 31 lower marginal and capital costs would have resulted.
In Table III .2 and Figure III. 2 we show the effect of withholding a license by the use of reserve prices in Belgium and Greece. In these simulations, details of which are given in Appendix 3, we assume either (1) an entrant, at license price = 0, materializes, builds a competing network, and generates the endogenous decrease in HHI captured by our model; (2) no rival enters, but spectrum allocated the 4 th license is utilized by incumbents, as the HHI yet remains constant. 32 The change in consumer surplus estimated under the 1 st (new entrant) scenario is "DCS1" (delta consumer surplus, scenario 1); the estimated change in consumer surplus under the 2 nd (spectrum reallocation) scenario is "DCS2." These changes, negative given that spectrum is being withheld by the reserve price policy, are compared to the positive welfare effects associated with auction revenues. Here we conservatively attribute all receipts to the reserve price and assume that one-third of government license revenues ("REV") constitute social savings ("SVREV"). Unsurprisingly, the spectrum withholding losses are greater when it is assumed that a new carrier enters the market at license reserve price = 0 (i.e., |DCS1|>|DCS2| for both the Belgian and Greek markets). This implies that the spectrum, abstracting from the cost of complementary capital infrastructure, is used most efficiently by an entrant. The comparison of interest is between either DCS estimate and SVREV. Focusing on DCS1, consumer surplus losses from the reserve policy are about fifteen to twenty times the magnitude of expected public financing gains in Belgium or Greece. This implies that giving away the licenses to facilitate competition between four rivals would have produced at least an order of magnitude more social welfare than restricting entry via the reserve policy. 
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Under the assumption that no new network would have been induced to enter at a license price of zero, welfare gains (DCS2) from spectrum redistribution among the incumbents also exceed those available from the reserve policy. The magnitude of this difference is still large (around one order of magnitude). However, the policies are not incompatible. Reserve prices could be utilized in an auction where spectrum allocated to unsold licenses is reallocated for the use of license winners.
33 Auction rules imposed without this provision result, as in this instance, in the unproductive withholding of both licenses and spectrum. The reserve policy gives economists ample reason for criticism.
It is of note that the Greek 3G auction employed a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, firms bid for a "basic" 3G license that granted the use of 25 MHz. Winners in the first stage were then permitted to bid for extra bandwidth. In this second stage reserve prices were much reduced. Of the three winners (the three 2G incumbents) in stage 1, one acquired licenses allocated another 20 MHz, another acquired licenses allocated 10 MHz, and the third did not bid the reserve price (and acquired no further 3G spectrum rights). This is evidence that the marginal demand for bandwidth by one of 33 This might, or might not, raise license bids, as the productive effects of the higher bandwidth to a particular license winner (raising value) would be at least partly offset by the increased bandwidth available to rivals (lowering value). See Hazlett (2008b) . three incumbents was relatively modest. 34 It does not, however, imply that the social value of such bandwidth was zero. Our simulation suggests, in fact, that an additional 35 MHz of spectrum, if equally divided among the three incumbents, would substantially reduce retail prices and expand output. This is evidence of the divergence between consumer surplus gains and license values.
Subsidizing Weak Bidders in U.S. PCS Auctions
Finally, consider the PCS C-block auctions that concluded in May 1996. U.S. regulators extended bidding credits to small businesses and rural telephone companies, extending qualified (that is, weak) bidders below-market interest rates on ten-year loans. The PCS C licenses were allocated 30 MHz of nationwide radio spectrum.
Bidding for licenses was intense; C-block winners committed to paying more than twice the price paid by winners of similar A and B licenses the previous year, after netting out bidding credits (Hazlett & Boliek 1999 ). Yet, service was not provided for a decade; in fact, bids generally went uncollected. The great majority of licensees quickly declared bankruptcy, effectively or explicitly defaulting on long-term obligations to the federal government. A lengthy legal battle ensued to determine ownership of the licenses.
35 Through 2004, allocated spectrum -nearly one-sixth the total bandwidth allocated to mobile phone service -went largely unused.
Our empirical model can be used to estimate the cost of this loss of bandwidth in the wireless telephone market. If cellular carriers had utilized another 30 MHz of radio spectrum, consumer welfare over the seven year period, 1997-2003, would have increased by an estimated $67 billion (using constant 2000 dollars). See Table III .3. 36 This loss easily exceeds any plausible public financing gains from the auction design mechanisms under discussion.
The term "fiasco" has been applied to auction regimes that generate relatively low bids, but we see the FCC bidding preferences as more deserving of the term. Ironically, 34 The bandwidth sold in the second stage (which was identical to the first-stage bandwidth, since spectrum segments were only actually positioned on the spectrum subsequent to the auction) had a reserve price which was just 1/10th as much per MHz; one of the firms which paid the reserve price for the basic license was unwilling to buy this additional spectrum, while the two other firms which paid the reserve price for the basic license were prepared to bid only a tiny bit more than 1/10th of the basic spectrum cost for additional spectrum. 35 The federal government effectively lost this battle. Bankrupt parties succeeded in both retaining rights to their FCC licenses and in reducing the obligations owed the federal government. In mid-2004, a negotiated settlement was finally achieved with the largest C Block licensee, Nextwave. In January and February 2005, an FCC auction reassigned C Block licenses returned to the FCC for debt satisfaction. In Table III .3 for each year between 1997 and 2003, we simulate the corresponding annual welfare change if an additional spectrum allocation of 30 MHz had occurred in that year. Differently from Table  III .1, we do not consider a perpetual benefit stream, limiting the estimated effects to a seven-year delay. This was actually a low-end estimate; the PCS C Block was ready for auction in 1994, yet licenses were not ultimately assigned until 2005. The 1994-96 lag was due to the administrative chore of devising bidding credits and an auction structure at the Federal Communications Commission; 1996-2005 was spent undoing the results of those mechanisms that had made market deployments unachievable. these preferences serve the economics literature as a paradigmatic example of how to intensify bidding via policies to assist weak operators: "partially subsidizing disadvantaged bidders, generally, more than compensates for the cost of the subsidy due to increased aggressiveness by first-line bidders" (Rothkopf et al., 2003, 82 ). This conclusion follows from an analysis that is "complementary to Ayres and Cramton (1996) ," which found "that a subsidy policy can sometimes materially benefit the bidtaker" (Rothkopf et al., 2003, 72) . Specifically, Ayres and Cramton found that FCC bidding credits generated net revenues in a 1994 auction. The overwhelming loss of welfare associated with the 1996 PCS bidding credits did not enter their policy analysis or many of those to follow. While the government's credit policies proved faulty, 37 the salient fact for welfare analysis of spectrum allocation policy is that any rule favoring less efficient providers entails expected costs.
38 These costs are properly included in the welfare analysis. Ayres and Cramton (1996, 11) discuss the possibility that licensees will default on long-term debt obligations, but dismiss its empirical significance: "If a designated bidder defaulted, the government could easily foreclose and resell the licenses, but their resale value would be uncertain."
IV. CONCLUSION
Auctions are generally superior to alternative rights-assignment mechanisms such as beauty contests or lotteries. 39 Wireless license auctions appear to assign licenses to the most efficient network operators, and to have limited certain forms of rent dissipation. Yet, auction rules that focus on revenue extraction may conflict with the goal of maximizing social welfare.
While revenue gains from enhanced competitive bidding are registered as leading directly to increase efficiency in offsetting activity-distorting taxes, the costs of such policies are often ignored. This is seen in frequent proposals recommending the use of reserve prices and bidding credits for inefficient wireless providers, as well as in the omission of time value when comparing alternative policy regimes.
Using a panel dataset involving 28 countries and quarterly data from January 1999 to June 2003, we identify primary determinants of social welfare in mobile telephony markets. We find that the amount of allocated spectrum and the degree of market competitiveness are key drivers of retail market outcomes. Each is heavily influenced by government regulation. Policies that increase competition and permit wireless markets to operate more efficiently 40 empirically dominate social gains from license rent extraction.
The role of ex-post market interaction in auction design has been studied (Caillaud & Jehiel 1998; Das Varma 2002; Jehiel, Moldovanu & Stacchetti 1999, among others) . However, the focus of that literature is on how externalities affect the bidding process and how a revenue maximizing seller should adjust auction mechanisms. In contrast, our focus here is on welfare-maximizing public policy.
The standard "spectrum auction" analysis points to the "embarrassingly low revenue in the Netherlands," for example, as indicating public policy failure (Wolfstetter 2001, 6 40 One important set of issues not investigated in our model pertains to technology mandates. Competition between competing wireless telephone standards (as in the United States) may produce better technology (e.g., CDMA) and more intense rivalry. See Gandal et al., 2003. 41 Welfare considerations have been discussed in auction theory, but as a side effect. For example, McAfee (1998) pointed out that, in the presence of interaction in a final market and under some plausible circumstances, the entrants could have advantages, in front of the incumbents, to win an auction for capacity. As a result, auctions do not have to be detrimental for consumers. The underlying idea is, at most, that maximization of auction revenues is not always in conflict with social welfare. Caillaud and Jehiel (1998) discussed the case of a welfare maximizing seller, however, in their article welfare is identified with an optimal allocation among bidders, externalities beyond bidders are not considered. 2005 , an outcome that merits little academic attention despite the bona fide fiasco it delivers in terms of lost wealth.
To be clear, our analysis does not imply that more efficient auction mechanisms yield little or no social gain. Historically, competitive bidding has, as advertised, saved social resources otherwise consumed by wasteful rent seeking (Hazlett & Michaels, 1993; CBO 1997) . Looking forward, were policy makers to deploy combinatorial auctions, as developed by several scholars (Cramton, Shoham & Steinberg 2006, e.g.), license assignments could be further improved. License auctions are a substantial contribution to economic policy, and economists productively contribute to their implementation. At a more general level, creating and assigning spectrum property rights in ways that economize on transaction costs continues to be the essential challenge for policy makers (Faulhaber 2005; Hazlett 2008a ).
What this analysis fundamentally aims to achieve is a balanced approach to spectrum policy. Competitive bidding mechanisms are not exogenous to market outcomes when they alter the structure, capacity, timing, or firm composition of the wireless sector. Hence, policy instruments employed to extract revenues may alter social welfare in other dimensions. These incremental changes result from regulatory choices and are properly incorporated when evaluating alternative spectrum regimes. Note that of the 46 countries in the Merrill Lynch database, many could not be used due to missing data (for variables not included in the ML database). The most difficult data to identify included Spectrum and Fixprice. To enable the inclusion of additional country data, Fixprice was adjusted in Canada: the reported values are zero from 1991 to 1994; thereafter it is not reported. We used an assumed value of "0" after 1994.
Appendix 2: Technical Notes
Here we explain the estimation and simulation procedures used to derive the estimates discussed in this paper. This note explains the basic system of estimated equations, the procedure for estimating HHI endogenously, model selection, and the way the simulations are developed.
System of Simultaneous Equations:
Given that our initial goal is to identify the variables that should be included in an empirical welfare analysis of spectrum policy, we pose a general equilibrium described by the system of equations introduced in section II:
Eq. A2.1: Mark Up Equation
We do not have the necessary data to construct the cost function c(·). Instead we treat cost as an implicit function of capital (proxied by density) and total spectrum known at certain loci by an empirical approximation that includes linear and quadratic terms. In the estimations we are then able to statistically define the underlying functional form.
The theoretical model motivates the explanatory variables we use in each empirical equation. The empirical Mark Up equation contains the main theoretical variables, including quadratic terms to capture non-linear effects. In addition, a cross term is also included to capture the implicit empirical approximation of c(·). We also include quadratic terms to capture non-linear effects. The empirical demand equation is an expanded log-transformed version of the theoretical one. The initial model we estimate is given by the following system of equations: where variables were defined in Section II.2.
HHI Endogeneity:
The behavior of HHI depends on spectrum allocations, the expected revenue per minute, the magnitude of demand (mainly total minutes demanded per time period), and other determinants. Hence, there is a two-way relationship between HHI, RPM and Q (TOTMIN in what follows) . These relationships pose an estimation problem that can be dealt in different ways, assuming that entrants are permitted under spectrum allocation rules. In this article we assume that HHI, RPM and TOTMIN have an intrinsic, statistically significant relationship, and accordingly HHI should be included in the system of equations as an endogenous variable determined together with RPM and TOTMIN in the equilibrium.
Estimation Procedure:
We estimate a system of two simultaneous equations using a one-way fixed effects panel data model, enhanced to improve efficiency. The method has three stages:
Stage 1: Simultaneous Equations Fixed Effects Panel Data Model
We follow the basic approach posed by Cornwell, Schmidt and Wyhowski (1992) for estimating a simultaneous equations model with panel data and an unobservable individual effect in each structural equation. To do this, we first perform a "within" transformation for unbalanced panel data, following Baltagi (2001, Ch. 9 ). Then we estimate a 3SLS model with the transformed variables. We use an "unstructured" variance-covariance matrix in the estimation to allow heteroskedastic error structure and simple autocorrelation behavior. 42 Tests reveal that this procedure is sufficient for the problem we investigate (Wooldridge, 2002, Ch. 10) . The regressions exclude NotCPP and Auction because they are time-invariant and the "within" transformation omits them.
We also have to consider that in all the specifications considered at least HHI is also endogenously determined, so we instrument it with other variables (see Table A2 .1, first stage, for all the auxiliary regressions in models 1 to 6). As a consequence, in these estimations, there are at least three endogenous variables in the first stage of the 3SLS procedure: RPM, TOTMIN, and HHI. In the third stage, however, there are only two equations: RPM and TOTMIN; HHI enters once in RPM (See Table A2 .2 for a summary of results). These estimations yield the simultaneous equations fixed effects panel data estimators. Given that we make a "within" transformation to our data in the previous stage, we were not able to include variables that are constant (within countries) over time, such as NotCPP and Auction. These variables contain substantial information, however, and the Plümper-Troeger technique allows us to capture this. To include these variables, we take the average residuals from Stage 1, and run two auxiliary regressions: where u i· is calculated as an average over the corresponding time period for each country i.
Once we estimate these equations we obtain the estimated or Pseudo-Fixed Effects through simple differentiation, so the Mark Up and Demand Equations Pseudo Fixed Effects corresponds to i νˆ and i ω , respectively. These Pseudo Fixed Effects have zero mean. The results of the regressions and the estimated Pseudo-Fixed Effects are contained in Table A2 .3 for all the specifications reported in Table II .2.
Stage 3: Fitting Pooled OLS Model
Up to now we have obtained a consistent (not necessarily the most efficient) estimator for our simultaneous equation fixed effects panel data model, and we adjust the estimation to fit time-invariant and rarely changing variables. Now we perform the last stage to improve efficiency. The reasoning is simple: if the inconsistency problem posed by the panel data OLS models is associated with the unobservable factors contained in the fixed effects, we can include the pseudo-fixed effects together with the variables in levels (say, with no "within" transformations) to obtain an improved estimation. 43 Furthermore, we can use 3SLS to estimate the whole system of equations. The results of the first stage of that procedure are reported in Table A2 .4. A summary of final results (third stage) for different specifications is reported in Table II .2 in Section II. Via this procedure we obtain the estimators used throughout the paper. More detailed estimation outputs are available from the authors.
Model Selection:
We start our estimations with the general specification posed at the beginning of this Appendix (leading to model 1). There we observe symptoms of multicolinearity that, through successive Restricted Model Tests (also called Chow Tests, or F-Tests), were sequentially discarded. This procedure allowed us to statistically evaluate alternative specifications permitting selection of the suitable model in such a way that avoids an arbitrary model specification. It is important to note, however, that all the specifications considered are theoretically consistent with the model developed in section 2, because the theoretical Mark Up equation is, by definition, consistent with the existence of non-linear terms and a generalized demand equation can contain quadratic terms, to capture nonlinear effects, without conflicting with theoretical properties of demand functions at least in the rank considered for the variables.
Final results for some of the estimated specifications are contained in Table II 
Simulation Procedures:
The key results in this paper derive from simulated scenarios. Given that our interest is in quantifying the effects of different policies in given countries and time periods, we use the "Model 6" specification and estimated parameters to perform simulations. In a typical simulation we assume that, in some specific country and period, more spectrum is made available for network operators, so the endogenous variables RPM, TOTMIN and HHI respond to such a policy. The results follow the premise that the empirical model provides us with an estimated final equilibrium and a confidence interval within which the observed situation should fall.
Because of our database contains monthly information, a direct simulation generates monthly figures. We translate those numbers into annual numbers and then we assume a net 5% discount to obtain net present values. In some situations we report those net present values, while in others it seems relevant to look at the annual effects.
Each equilibrium forecast is computed until it achieves stability.
44
Then we estimate a confidence interval based on Hotelling's T 2 statistic. The distribution of the Welfare Change Measurement is assumed to be a Multivariate Normal with four dimensions, two for price (RPM) and quantity (TOTMIN) in the starting equilibrium, and two for the corresponding variables in the final equilibrium. Instead of using an analytic solution for the marginal distribution of this probability function, we simulate the behavior in the neighborhood of each equilibrium and then compute the Welfare Change.
Simulations were performed in 1000 groups of 1000 cases each, with shocks to the system of equations coming from a Bivariate Normal distribution with mean zero for each dimension, and variance-covariance matrix estimated from Stage 3 residuals. These experiments were repeated at least one hundred times and produce stable results. 
Note: "DV" stands for Dependent Variable. Significance: * 1%, ** 5%, *** 10%. "R-squared" is a pseudo-R-Squared that can be less than 0. Note: "DV" stands for Dependent Variable. Significance: * 1%, ** 5%, *** 10%. "R-squared" is a pseudo-R-Squared that can be less than 0. Note: "DV" stands for Dependent Variable. Significance: * 1%, ** 5%, *** 10%. "R-squared" is a pseudo-R-Squared that can be less than 0. 
Note: "DV" stands for Dependent Variable. Significance: * 1%, ** 5%, *** 10%. Note: "DV" stands for Dependent Variable. Significance: * 1%, ** 5%, *** 10%. "R-squared" is a pseudo-R-Squared that can be less than 0. 
